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The Long Swings in Economic Understanding* 
  
 
Axel Leijonhufvud 
University of Trento 
 
 
Changing worldviews 
 
The worldview of a representative macroeconomist has changed 
repeatedly and drastically over the century from which we have just escaped.  
With the «new classics», it may indeed seem to have come full circle. But that, 
on closer inspection, turns out to be largely an illusion. True enough, 
economists a hundred years ago generally believed that the economy always 
tended towards equilibrium.  Today, «tendencies» do not enter into it one way 
or another. The modern macroeconomist believes the economy is in 
equilibrium.  True enough, the main policy objective of  economists a hundred 
years ago was to stabilize the price level and today low inflation  has become 
the overriding goal of macropolicy.  But in seeking to understand how the price 
level could be controlled, Wicksell and Fisher were motivated by a passionate 
concern with the distributive injustices arising from inflations and deflations. 
Distributive justice figures nowhere in the leading school of  modern 
macroeconomics1 and certainly not in the muddled «shoeleather» arguments 
marshalled in support of this exclusive concern with eliminating inflation.  
 
If we shorten the time perspective to fifty or forty years, the contrasts 
are more drastic. The Great Depression had shattered the representative 
economist’s faith in the self-adjusting capabilities of the market system. At the 
height of the influence of Keynesianism, he -- it was a he -- believed that the 
private sector was unstable, riddled with market failures, and prone to 
                                                 
* To appear in a Festschrift for Jean-Paul Fitoussi, edited by Kumaraswamy Velupillai. 
1The growing inequality of incomes in recent years is, of course, attracting the 
attention of prominent economists but hardly within the real business cycle school. In the 
United States, James K. Galbraith (1998) has played a role corresponding to that of Fitoussi in 
France.  
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fluctuations amplified by multiplier and accelerator effects.  But he also 
believed that a benevolent and competent government, dependable in its 
democratic role as the agent of the electorate, could stabilize the economy and 
ameliorate most market failures. 
 
Today, he -- or she -- believes the economy keeps to an intertemporal 
equilibrium path. As long as  not disturbed by bad policies, markets will take 
care of all coordination problems. Trouble may arise in this otherwise idyllic 
picture on two fronts. First, if «inflexibilities» in the labor market are tolerated, 
the natural rate of unemployment may be quite high. More importantly, 
governments are seen to be prone to excessive deficits and inflationary finance, 
to be constitutionally time-inconsistent and to be addicted to playing the 
Phillips curve. 
 
To the older generation, macropolicy was stabilization policy. To the 
present generation, it has become the art of constraining governments. If the 
older was uncritical in trusting the power of government to do good, the 
present one has a distinctly cynical view of representative democracy. 
 
Jean-Paul Fitoussi’s work has run counter to this trend of the times.  
During the ‘nineties, it was not easy to get a fair hearing for the view that the 
high interest rates with which the Bank of France defended the franc exchange 
rate against the DM bore a lot of responsibility for France’s high rates of 
unemployment.2   Indeed, even being allowed to speak was a bit of problem.3  
And his concern with the worsening income distribution and its effect, in turn, 
on the acceptability of the contrat social raised hardly an echo in an American-
dominated economics profession.  
 
There are many strands to the story how the worldview of the economic 
profession came to change so radically.  The strand that runs through the 
                                                 
2I vividly recall that at the 1997 IEA conference in Trento where Jean-Paul’s paper 
(Fitoussi, 2001) gave both the theoretical argument for and much empirical evidence consistent 
with this view, Robert Lucas expressed himself shocked to have to listen to such «inflationary» 
views. Surely, he argued, we knew better by this time.  Of course, the ECB was eventually to 
give Fitoussi the monetary policy that the Bank of France had denied him. The result was that 
French unemployment finally began to shrink -- without inflation.  
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3Jean-Paul Fitoussi, Le débat interdit (1995). 
history of macroeconomics may be the most important of them all and I will 
concentrate on it here.  It is the story of changing views on the «automaticity» 
of the market economy. A second strand must at least be mentioned. It has 
developed mainly within the Public Choice literature.  It is here that an 
understanding of politicians and government bureaucrats as utility-maximizing 
individuals has evolved from a corrective of an earlier, often naive perception 
of them as «public servants» into an increasingly cynical alternative view of 
them as causes of, rather than solutions to, all manner of economic problems.  
 
 
The General Theory as a Response to the Depression 
 
The response to the Great Depression among economists and policy 
makers was confused and incoherent. The challenge was met most effectively 
by Keynes.  The General Theory brought a great advance in our understanding 
of depressions and particularly of the impediments to recovery from such 
extreme states. The younger generation of economists in particular received it 
eagerly and, while its positive contribution was not altogether clearely 
understood, its legacy came to dominate macroeconomics for 30 years.  But the 
work had weaknesses as well as strengths. These flaws in the work, combined 
with common misunderstandings of it, eventually undermined its influence. 
  
The core of Keynes’s theoretical contribution I would (today) describe 
as follows.4 His point of departure was  Marshall.  Marshall’s theory assumed 
adaptive, rather than optimizing behavior. At the cost, perhaps, of some 
oversimplification, consider a universe of agents obeying very simple «laws of 
motion». For example, consumers will increase their consumption of a good 
whenever their demand-price exceeds the market price. Producers will increase 
output whenever market price exceeds their supply-price. Middlemen will 
increase prices when faced with excess demand, etc.  
 
Before Keynes, it was a firmly and generally held opinion that if all 
agents obeyed these laws of motion, the dynamics of the economy would 
surely carry it to full employment.  Only violations of the laws of motion -- 
                                                 
4Cf. Leijonhufvud (1998).  
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such as rigid wages or other «inflexibilities» in the labor market -- could stand 
in the way of this result.  One notes that this is the understanding to which 
economics has once again come around in recent years. Keynes, however, 
discovered that this proposition was not true.  The monetary and financial 
institutions of a modern economy are such that saving is not an effective 
demand for future consumption nor is the offer of labor  an effective demand 
for present consumption.  Some of the «market forces» needed to guide the 
collective adaptation process may be missing therefore. When this occurs the 
dynamics of the system may fail «automatically» to carry it to full 
employment.  A theory that recognizes the possibility of such effective demand 
failures has a valid claim to being a more general theory.  This, I believe, is 
Keynes’s main claim to lasting fame as a  theorist. 
 
The core of the theory was the saving-investment nexus, which is to 
say, the problem of intertemporal coordination.  Years before the General 
Theory was completed, he had reached a diagnosis of the depression that he 
held with great conviction. The decline in fixed investment was the cause 
«...without any doubts or reserves whatsoever -- the whole of the explanation 
of the present state of affairs» (Keynes, 1931, p. 351).  The trouble was that the 
 interest rate did not bring saving and investment into line: «In the past it has 
been usual to believe that there was some preordained harmony by which 
saving and investment were necessarily equal .... But unfortunately this is not 
so, I venture to say with certainty that is not so.» (Ibid, p. 355). There was «a 
fatal flaw ... in orthodox reasoning ... largely due to the failure of the classical 
doctrine to develop a satisfactory theory of the rate of interest» (Keynes, 1934, 
p. 489).  (Not a word, of course, about rigid wages being even part of the 
problem.) 
 
The liquidity preference theory of interest with which Keynes sought to 
replace that classical doctrine was however worse than unsatisfactory.  He had 
somehow convinced himself that if saving and investment determined income 
(and not interest), then liquidity preference and money supply must determine 
interest (and not money income or the price level).  This meant, among other 
things, that it was not possible that the interest rate would adjust so as to 
coordinate consumption and production over time. A far stronger assertion than 
the  proposition that it cannot be depended on always to do the job! This 
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doctrine became a rich source of confusion.5 From it stems the Paradox of 
Thrift, for example,  and also the proposition that «investment causes saving 
but saving does not cause investment» to which Keynes’s Cambridge followers 
have shown  a fierce attachment but which fails to throw much light on postwar 
problems of capital formation around the world.  
 
In the early years of the depression, Keynes had expressed himself 
forcefully on the dangers of debt-deflation. An «immense burden of bonded 
debt, both national and international ... fixed in terms of money» had been built 
up (Keynes, 1930b, p. 128).  This entire structure would be «deranged» with 
disastrous consequences (1931, p. 361).  It is surprising, therefore, that this 
theme is hardly mentioned in the General Theory -- despite the evident fact 
that this is exactly what had happened in the United States in the meantime.  
But Keynes had apparently convinced himself that the contemporary capitalist 
economy had a chronic tendency to save in excess of what its capital markets 
would channel into investment. Now, the saving that does not end up financing 
investment will be directed towards improving liquidity positions. But there is 
a crucial qualitative difference between the temporary tidying up of balance 
sheets in an ordinary recession and the desperate scramble for liquidity in the 
wake of financial crash. The General Theory does not make the distinction. In 
the midst of the great depression with the capitalist economies in dire straits, 
while the totalitarian threats were mounting on both left and right, it was surely 
exceedingly difficult to maintain a balanced perspective on the «fatal flaw» in 
the economic system that Keynes thought he had identified. But the result was 
that he generalized from the depression and consequently came to exaggerate 
the economy’s instability, specifically with regard to the frequency with which 
to expect strong deviation-amplifying effects through the consumption 
multiplier (Leijonhufvud, 1973).6 
To Keynes, it was always the saving of households that was the 
                                                 
5To be fair, Keynes had set himself a difficult analytical task. On the one hand he had 
to explain what was going wrong with relative prices and therefore with allocation; on the 
other, he had to keep track of the flow-of-funds through the economy because households were 
cash-constrained while firms adjusted output in response to cash flow. Modern theory is easier 
in not having any reason to deal with these «hydraulic» problems. Even when a cash-in-
advance constraint is introduced it only serves to determine aggregate money demand and does 
not give rise to effective demand failures. 
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problem.  He rather slighted the liquidity management of firms and its role in 
propagating negative (or positive) impulses.6 In a simple model with only 
outside money, the excess of saving over investment constitutes a 
straightforward excess demand for money.  More generally, in recessions, 
firms which temporarily are not finding profitable investment opportunities 
will seek to improve their balance sheets by repaying bank loans while the 
banks, in turn, respond to this «reflux» by returning their borrowed reserves to 
the Central Bank. The inside money stock thus covaries with the output. This 
mechanism was explained very clearly in the Treatise but is missing in the 
General Theory. It might have been helpful to the Keynesian side in the 
Monetarist controversy if it had been an integral part of their canon.  
 
The focus on households directs attention to the inability of the 
unemployed to exercise effective demand for consumption goods. Most 
unemployed workers in interwar Britain were surely income-constrained to an 
extent that, in large part due to the influence of Keynes, has become 
uncommon in more recent decades. But it also directs attention away from 
another effective demand failure which, again, pertains to the balance sheets of 
firms in a depression.  In an intertemporal general equilibrium model, it is 
assumed that firms can exchange the promise of revenues from future output in 
exchange for the present command over the resources required to realize that 
output. If this exchange cannot be effectuated, very little growth can be 
realized. Yet, this is what happens in the wake of a financial crash that leaves 
large volumes of bad loans outstanding between banks and businesses. Policies 
that do not tackle this specific effective demand failure directly are unlikely to 
help, as the experience of Japan over the last decade demonstrates.  
Conventional Keynesian analysis will suggest  public works and low interest 
rates as the measures to be tried but the Japanese problem is neither household 
income-constraints nor a «liquidity trap» in the usual sense.   
 
 
Keynesianism in the United States 
                                                 
6Peter Howitt (2002) stresses multiplier-propagation within the business sector rather 
than through household consumption behavior.  His model, however, hinges on a thick market 
externality rather than on the liquidity argument stressed here. 
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The Liquidity Preference hypothesis of interest determination is, I have 
contended, an error which put Cambridge Keynesians onto the wrong track.  
But it had virtually no influence on the development of Keynesianism in the 
United States and played no role in its eventual failure.  Liquidity Preference 
vs. Loanable Funds was a contest between two hypotheses about what drives 
the economy’s adaptation to shocks and it proved more or less impossible to 
make sense of the issue between them with the help of the simultaneous 
equation approaches that became standard after the war. Indeed, the American 
Keynesians were constantly surprised at being attacked with such vehemence 
as «bastard Keynesians»  by their Cambridge counterparts,  not comprehending 
that Solow-type growth models in which «saving did cause investment» were 
an outrage to those who counted themselves  true believers. 
 
The theoretical troubles of American Keynesianism stem instead from 
the so-called «Neoclassical synthesis», so named and long insisted upon by 
Paul Samuelson whose unequalled prestige did much to gain it general 
acceptance. The «synthesis» maintained that Keynesian theory was a special 
case of the more general neoclassical theory, obtained by adding the restriction 
of «rigid wages» to the latter.  As an interpretation of Keynes, this was 
calumny but, given the scholarly standards of the profession as they are today, 
the sticky wages calmuny sticks and cannot be revoked no matter how often it 
is shown to be false. In any case, for a couple of decades most everyone was 
pleased to accept the implied contention that Keynesianism was wrong in pure 
theory but right in policy practice. 
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However, in switching back to the pre-Keynesian preoccupation with 
sticky wages, American Keynesianism gradually lost sight of the intertemporal 
coordination problem. Keynes’s distrust of the financial markets was only kept 
alive by a small band of post-Keynesians while the major American 
Keynesians made great contributions to the development of modern finance 
theory (which has been anything but distrustful of them). It is instructive to 
recall how Keynes’s  idea that interest rates, rather than wages, might be too 
high for full employment came to disappear from the theory that was made to 
bear his name. In Modigliani (1944), two different unemployment solutions to 
the simultaneous equation model were given. One, the basic one, where the 
money wage was fixed at too high a level relative to the money stock to allow 
full employment; the other, called «Keynes’s special case», with the rate of 
interest too high for investment to equal saving at the full employment level of 
income. The latter, however, Modigliani thought of as a case of «rigid interest» 
which would apply only if the economy was in a true liquidity trap. A few 
years later, Patinkin (1948) pointed out that, in principle, the Pigou effect could 
take the economy out of the trap and back to full employment and in 
subsequent revised versions of his famous paper, Modigliani (e.g., 1980) 
conceded the point. This left the basic case  -- unemployment is due to wages 
that are too high and its persistence is due to their downward rigidity.   
 
Although the Pigou effect argument is flawed almost to the point of 
fraudulence, the liquidity trap was generally regarded as a theoretical curiosity 
and its elimination was mourned by nobody. Keynes would not have mourned 
it either. His concern had been with interest rates that, while not in the least 
«inflexible»,  were kept too high by central bank policy or by bearishness on 
the exchanges, thus setting in motion a decline in real output which in turn 
would bring with it a worsening of investment expectations. This could happen 
at any level of the interest rate, not just at some small fraction of one percent. 
But this his central hypothesis now disappeared as it were  through a logical 
«trap» door. 
 
This development allowed a great simplification of «Keynesian» 
economics which greatly aided its marketing throughout the world.  For short-
run purposes, all you now needed to know was (a) the volume of nominal 
expenditure and (b)  the level of the inherited rigid money wage. A truncated 
version of IS-LM will serve as a theory of nominal income and, if just a 
historically fixed wage rate is too crude, it may be replaced by a Phillips-curve. 
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It is worth taking note of what this simplification of textbook 
Keynesianism entails.  A complete simultaneous equation representation of the 
«analytical nucleus» of the General Theory, as provided by Barens (1999), will 
have separate supply-price as well as demand-price functions for capital and 
for consumer goods. Shocks to investment expectations impinge on this system 
through the demand-price for capital goods. This model has a relative price 
structure and reasonable «microfoundations.» It could be modified so as to 
include the response of the supply price of labor to the volume of employment. 
But it would not allow the ad hoc addition of a  Phillips-curve (and even less, 
of course, of an aggregate supply function)7. The Phillips-curve came in handy, 
however, as an appendage to an IS-LM model from which relative prices had 
been removed. 
 
IS-LM understood simplistically as a theory of nominal income and 
augmented by the Phillips curve, but deprived of the intertemporal 
coordination issue, constituted the poor, enfeebled, benighted «Keynesian 
economics» that succumbed to Monetarism. 
 
Monetarism and the Natural Rate 
 
Milton Friedman’s (1968) Presidential Address to the American 
Economics Association, in which he introduced the concept of the Natural Rate 
of Unemployment, is a milestone in the great shift in economists’ worldview.  
Snowdon (1999, p. 32) has collected a few testimonies: «very likely the most 
influential article ever published in an economics journal» (James Tobin); «the 
most influential article written in macroeconomics in the past two decades» 
(Robert Gordon); «one of the decisive intellectual achievements of postwar 
economics» (Paul Krugman); «easily the most influential paper on 
macroeconomics published in the post-war era» (both Mark Blaug and Robert 
Skidelsky).  
 
The influence of that paper is undeniable. It mislead just about 
everybody and diverted economic theory down a track that, ironically, was to 
prove destructive also of Friedman’s monetarism. It acquired immense 
authority by the fact that the inflationary decade of the 1970's appeared to 
verify all its predictions. But even so it could not have swept everything before 
it had not all the intellectual sloppiness surrounding the neoclassical synthesis 
enfeebled its potential opposition. 
 
There were two things wrong with it. First, it assumed that all money 
could be analyzed  as if it were outside money  -- and therefore neutral. 
                                                 
7A number of people have pointed out the over determinacy of adding an aggregate 
supply function to models that include an IS-schedule which subsumes reduced forms of 
market demand and supply functions.  Cf., e.g., Barens (1997). 
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Second, it presumed that as long as nominal wages adjusted to monetary 
changes, the economy would settle down to the natural rate of unemployment 
whether or not it were also at the natural rate of interest.8  
 
Once anticipated, an outside money inflation would surely displace the 
Phillips-locus vertically. If we were to suppose that the historical growth rate 
of outside money had been x% higher than it actually was, it is plausible  
(abstracting from inflation tax effects) that the historically given scatter of 
points would have been x% higher in Phillips space. Two things that do not 
follow are worth noting. First, it is not true that all central bank actions entail, 
or amount to the same thing as, changing the equilibrium nominal scale of the 
system.9 Second, while correctly anticipated inflation means that the scatter 
will be displaced vertically, it does not by itself mean that the scatter will 
collapse to a single vertical «long run Phillips curve» as soon as wage-
adjustments have caught up with changes in the outside money stock.  If saving 
were to exceed investment10  at NAIRU, employment will not converge to 
NAIRU. 
 
Two stylized facts should be kept in mind.  One is that while the U.S. 
short-run Phillips curve misbehaved in the 1970's and early ‘80's as predicted 
by Friedman, we also have to explain why it behaved quite differently  before 
the late ‘60's or after the mid-’80's.  The answer, I suggest, is that the 1970's 
was the decade of American outside money inflation. The other is that NAIRU 
has proved empirically hopeless to nail down.  The thing is found to move as 
required to fit the new worldview. So unemployment under Reagan in the 
1980's was blamed on the natural rate of unemployment having shifted up, not 
on the high real rates of interest. In the same manner, unemployment in France 
in the 1990's was widely blamed -- Professor Fitoussi notably dissenting -- on 
                                                 
8Keynesian economics in its early days had overcome this kind of partial equilibrium 
reasoning about the aggregate labor market. But there has been much backsliding among 
Keynesians later. 
9Letting borrowed reserves expand or making them contract are examples of central 
bank actions that do not change the volume of outside money. 
10Or, if (S + T + IM) > (I + G + X) 
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the inflexibilities of the French labor market, not on the high interest rates. In 
the same vein, the long Clinton boom was supposedly due to the great 
flexibility of the American labor market, not to low interest rates and loose 
liquidity.   
 
Friedman’s natural rate hypothesis was accepted by all and sundry. 
«Keynesians» who had opposed him on a range of issues did not themselves 
have an explanation for unemployment other than lagging wage-adjustment 
and, in order to make any case at all for stabilization policy, found themselves 
in the position of having to argue that money wage inflexibility was more of a 
problem than monetarists were willing to recognize. The so-called «New 
Keynesians» have subsequently set themselves the task of finding  reasons for 
wage stickiness that are «rational» enough not to earn them the disapprobation 
of Lucas & Co.   
 
Acceptance of the natural rate hypothesis  left increased labor market 
«flexibility» as the only remaining  remedy for unemployment. So this has 
become the one-note tune of macroeconomic debate in Europe. No doubt, 
many European countries have allowed institutional arrangements to develop 
that inhibit competition and mobility in a way that benefits some groups to the 
expense of others. A good argument can be made for some of these 
arrangements to be modified.  The problem is that it is not clear how far the 
flexibility argument is going to be pushed. If «inflexibilities» of one sort or 
another really are the only reasons for unemployment, are we going to demand 
of labor that, whenever rates of interest are too high or animal spirits too weak, 
workers take enough of a cut to encourage business to provide employment? 
The notion that labor should be obliged to subsidize business whenever 
intertemporal coordination fails is surely fraught with moral hazard. 
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Economic ideas have political consequences. The natural rate 
hypothesis may be logically weak and empirically useless but it has become an 
ideological pillar of the  new right. And its acceptance on the other side of the 
political spectrum explains much of the evident intellectual incoherence on the 
left.  Stabilization policy used to be something tangibly useful that government 
could do for lower income citizens. But if you accept that unemployment is the 
fault of labor and that income distribution has to be whatever a globalized 
economy may dictate, it becomes difficult to formulate a message that will 
carry conviction for the traditional voters on the left. 
 
 
The New Political Economy 
 
In the monetarism of Friedman or Brunner and Meltzer, nominal wages 
and/or prices were sticky so that monetary policy would have real effects over 
the short to medium run.  The problem was the long and variable lags which 
made the appropriate timing and size of policy interventions a matter of 
unreliable guesswork. Business fluctuations were thought in large part to be 
due to the monetary authorities engaging in discretionary policies that would 
be beneficial only by chance and which they therefore had better refrain from 
in favor of following a constant money growth rate rule. 
 
In the rational expectations version of monetarism, the long and 
variable lags evaporate leaving only a soon-to-be-resolved momentary 
confusion resulting from policy «surprises.» The idea that only «unanticipated 
money» could have real effects completely eviscerated the monetarism of 
Friedman and of Brunner and Meltzer. Since monetary policy surprises are to 
no sensible purpose, the rational expectations version of monetarism left 
central banks with nothing of «real» usefulness to do. This posed a dilemma for 
the new worldview that the behavior of governments (monetary authorities) is 
the cause of macro instability. The ultimate resolution of this dilemma was to 
be real business cycle theory according to which, although governments are up 
to no good, they are not the cause, and should not attempt to be the  «cure», of 
fluctuations in aggregate activity that are nothing but rational adaptations to 
variations in productivity growth.  Meanwhile, however, there developed  a 
curious literature11 in which it was assumed that self-interested politicians 
thought voters would reward them for using monetary policy to fool citizens 
into working harder than consistent with the natural rate of unemployment.  
This line of analysis produced two policy recommendations which, although 
not well founded, have had considerable influence, namely, (a) to make central 
banks independent so as to constrain the politicians and (b) to steer the banks 
away from any tendency to play the Phillips curve on their own by giving them 
only the single objective of low inflation. 
                                                 
11Stemming from the twin papers by Barro and Gordon (1983a, 1983b). 
 
 14
 
This policy doctrine is the perfect expression of the new worldview: the 
private sector will take care of itself, stabilization policy is a vain ambition, and 
the government had better be constrained from pursuing it. The underlying 
cynicism about government is sometimes strikingly expressed: «The past 20 
years, which has seen the rise of independent central banks, is all about getting 
priorities right and getting rid of democratic money, which is always 
shortsighted, bad money» (Dornbusch, 2000, p. 23, italics added).  
 
But central banks don’t just «print money».  Within reasonably stable 
monetary regimes, they have considerable short run powers to regulate real 
rates of interest and the real volume of bank credit.  Unless the private sector is 
perfectly stable, these powers will be potentially useful. The financial crises 
which have multiplied around the world in recent years make the argument for 
totally foreswearing their use  anything but persuasive.12  
 
Growth theory instead? 
 
The development of equilibrium business cycle theory has had the 
logical consequence that the leading people in macroeconomics today are 
losing interest in business fluctuations and are instead turning their attention to 
economic growth.  Assuming that people adjust to business cycles as smoothly 
and efficiently as  to seasonal fluctuations, the welfare loss from cycles can be 
shown to be relatively trivial. By the force of compound interest the welfare 
gain from an increase in the growth rate even if by only a fraction of one 
percent will on the other hand be of great magnitude within a generation or 
two.  
 
It is interesting to recall that the compound interest argument was made 
quite eloquently some 70 years ago by Keynes (1930a).  But with Keynes there 
was a crucial difference. When he contemplated the «Economic Prospects of 
                                                 
12If low inflation is not to be the only goal of central banks, however, the 
independence doctrine is in trouble.  Making decisions on trade-offs that have distributive 
consequences is surely an intrinsically political responsibility, not to be handed to unelected 
technocrats. 
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our Grandchildren», he also knew that the train to that future might very well 
derail.  He had  an ever-present sense of «the fragility of the existing social 
order.»13  That sense must have been shared by most educated Europeans 
between the two wars. Fitoussi is prominent among the fewer Europeans that 
share it today.  But the fragility of the social contract is a rather alien idea to 
Americans! 
 
Late 20th Centory Macropolicies 
 
The worst case scenario of the old worldview was that of a great 
depression brought about by widespread insolvency in the private sector. The 
cure would be deficit spending by a solvent government.  The worst case 
envisaged in the new view is high inflation engaged in by an insolvent 
government.  It can be cured by trimming government spending -- or by higher 
taxes paid by solvent citizens and firms, although that is less often 
recommended.14 
  
The Washington consensus reflected the new worldview in the 
emphasis put on restraining government spending and reducing the size of the 
public sector through privatizations. In Europe, the debt- and deficit-limits of 
the Maastricht treaty expressed the same philosophy. In the United States, 
California law requires the state government to balance the budget each year. 
 
The Washington consensus was to a large extent formed by the 
economic history of several Latin American countries in the 1980's -- as seen 
by economists and policy makers in the IMF, the World Bank and the US 
government.  The monetization of large deficits, the high inflation and 
economic disruption of the problem countries were contrasted to the economc 
success of Chile. Through the spectacles of the new worldview, one 
prescription will do for all cases: constrain the government so as to unleash the 
initiative of the private sector.  
                                                 
13The phrase is Moggridge’s, cf. his (1993, p. 154) 
14It is reasonably clear what should and can be done in each worst case scenario.  It is 
not easy to prescribe a medicine when, as in Argentina, what materializes combines the worst 
of both. 
 
 16
 
The story behind some of these Latin American cases is however not so 
simple and straightforward.15 In more than one instance, it started with large 
defaults in the private sector threatening the solvency also of the banking 
system. The government then stepped in to stop the financial crises from 
developing into a general depression.  This required in effect the 
«nationalization» of the bad loans.  But the poor ordinary tax payer is not 
easily persuaded to pay for the mistakes or swindles of the once rich and 
powerful who by then may be living in fair comfort abroad. It was not in the 
social contract that he should pay. But someone has to pay, and if the ordinary 
tax payer will not vote the taxes, he must nonetheless be made to foot the bill 
through the inflation tax. 
 
Thus distributive conflict  often lurks at bottom of these inflations. 
When this is the case, it is not to be solved, and may be exacerbated,  by IMF 
conditionality although outside pressure may help a particular government to 
enact responsible policies. In the case of Chile, which managed to resume 
growth with price level stability, the distributive conflict that had boiled up 
under Allende was suppressed by Pinochet.  
 
The 1990's also showed the new worldview in action in the wave of 
privatizations that swept around the world, enthusiastically supported by the 
international financial organizations and of course by the private institutions 
that earned the fees in these transactions. Without a doubt governments 
everywhere have gotten into areas of economic activity that could be handled 
as well or better by the private sector.  But the pell-mell privatizations in 
Russia, for example, seem to have been carried through on the simple 
conviction that getting the people’s assets out of government control and into 
private hands in whatever way and on whatever terms would surely be welfare 
improving. Whose welfare was improved did not seem important. Typically, 
questions of distributive justice were not given high priority. 
 
The East Asian crises of 1998 also showed the new worldview to be too 
simple.The Indonesian crisis  was triggered by large corporations defaulting on 
                                                 
15Cf. Daniel Vaz (1999) 
 
 17
dollar-denominated debt. The ensuing scramble for dollars sent the exchange 
rate plummeting, thereby demonstrating the new risk that countries run in a 
world of globalized finance, namely, foreign currency-denominated debt-
deflation. Although the finances of the central Indonesian government had 
been in reasonable shape for a decade, the IMF, acting on «consensus» instinct, 
at first demanded fiscal retrenchment and then had to reverse itself.  The 
concept of «crony capitalism» was coined to allow the Indonesian crisis to be 
fitted into the worldview that the government is still always the problem.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
For long periods, the evolution of economics will be driven almost 
exclusively by the internal logic of successive answers turning into new 
questions. In macroeconomics, the path from Friedman’s monetarism to 
Prescott’s real business cycle theory seems a good example. But from time to 
time, external events irrupt more or less rudely on the process. Had the Great 
Depression never happened, the rise and long dominance of Keynesian 
economics is unthinkable. Less dramatically, the inflation of the 1970's played 
a significant role in its demise. 
  
External events affect the thinking of economists more strongly the 
closer to home they come.  In recent decades, high-brow economics has been 
fashioned in Boston and Chicago just as surely as haute couture has sprung 
from Paris and Milano. The various crises in the emerging economies have not 
had much of an impact on today’s economics. The asset-price bubbles that 
grew and burst in countries such as Japan and Sweden may have felt a bit 
closer.   When a large stock market bubble implodes in the United States itself, 
intertemporal equilibrium economics and the finance theory built on it is put in 
question.  If an when the dollar exchange rate bubble bursts, it will demand  a  
more thorough reevaluation.  Similarly, the depredations of East Asian crony 
capitalists or Russian oligarchs took place far away.  Credit Lyonaisse was 
closer. Enron and Global Crossing failed right in the house. Corporations may 
be no more obedient agents of their stakeholders than are democratic 
governments as agents of their principals, the voters. 
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The two worldviews with which I started are obviously simplistic  
extremes and as such they will at times prove dangerous guides in a more 
complex reality. External events of the last few years  may start the pendulum 
of economic opinion swinging back once more.  Perhaps it is already in 
motion.  
 
But these long swings in economic understanding do us no good.  
Although the impulses of external events play a causal role in bringing them 
about, their propagation internal to the economics profession seems subject to 
herd behavior. If we are ever to stabilize the pendulum of economic opinion 
somewhere in the judicious -- but ideologically always unsatisfactory -- middle 
and recognize the capacity for good and its limits of both markets and 
governments, it will have to be through people who do not run with the herd 
but think for themselves and tirelessly follow their convictions. Like our friend, 
Jean-Paul Fitoussi. 
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